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Abstract: In the pair of articles of which this is the first, I shall present a set of 
problems and philosophical proposals that have in recent years been associated with 
the term “relativism”. All these problems and proposals concern the question of how 
we should represent thought and speech about certain topics. The main issue here is 
whether we should model such mental states or linguistic acts as involving 
representational contents that are absolutely correct or incorrect, or whether, 
alternatively, their correctness should be thought of as varying with some (more or 
less surprising) factor. 
In this, first, article, I shall discuss the general issue of relativism about 
representational content. I shall claim that there are legitimate ways of attributing 
contents that are absolute truth-bearers, and there are also equally legitimate ways of 
attributing relativistic representational contents. 
In the companion piece “Relativism 2: Semantic Content”, I look in more detail 
at the more specific question whether semantic contents (i.e. the contents assigned to 
linguistic utterances in the semantics of natural language) should be construed in an 
absolutist or a relativist way. 
1. Connecting traditional questions of relativism 
According to Plato, Protagoras was concerned with the following question: when a 
wind feels cold to me (makes me shiver), and does not feel cold to you (does not 
make you shiver), is there one way the wind is in itself? Is it either cold or not cold 
independently of how it feels to anyone?1 The question can be taken in several 
philosophically interesting ways. One is the question of whether there is an objective 
reality at all, that is independent of what appears to anyone or what anyone believes. 
Another question is whether appearances can ever be mistaken, i.e. whether there is a 
difference between appearance and reality. A figure whom we might call “radical 
subjectivist” claims that whatever seems to anyone to be so is in fact so for him or 
her. It might follow that error is impossible. Plato (in the Theaetetus) is only one of 
many who have examined the coherence of radical subjectivism. These two 
questions—the question whether there is an objective reality and the question whether 
appearances can mislead (or beliefs be mistaken) about reality—no doubt form part of 
what philosophers have been discussing under the heading “relativism”.  
A third question arises independently of these two. Suppose we grant that there are 
ways the wind is in itself, i.e. the objective properties of the wind (for example, its 
speed, its temperature, its causal history and effects etc), and that these properties are 
independent of the way the wind seems to anyone.2 Suppose we also grant that 
mistakes about whether the wind is cold are possible. For example, when I fail to 
bring a coat because I mistakenly think that the wind outside is not cold; or perhaps 
                                                 
1 In his Theaetetus (152b), Plato uses the famous Protagoras quote (“Man is the measure of all things”) 
to introduce a discussion of this issue. What exactly Protagoras himself was interested in remains a 
matter of speculation, because the famous “Man-measure” quote is the only surviving bit of text from 
him about the matter. 
2 Plausibly there is dependence in the other direction: the way the wind seems to people would seem to 
depend on the objective properties of the wind, such as its speed, temperature etc. 
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the mistake I commit when I think the wind is cold because I have a fever and my 
perception is distorted. Then we can still ask: if I think the wind is cold, and you think 
it is not cold, might we both be judging correctly? Might we both be representing the 
wind correctly or be making correct judgements about the wind? This question is 
independent of radical doubts about objective reality and independent of radical 
doubts about the possibility of error.3 It is the type of question that has given rise to 
some of the recent debates concerning relativism, and which is the topic of the current 
essay. 
2. Relativism and Absolutism 
The issue concerns all types of mental and linguistic representation. Representation in 
general involves representing something as being some way. We can compare 
different representations as to the way they represent things: they can represent them 
in the same or different ways. Abstracting from such relations of similarity, we can 
speak of the “content” of a representation: representations that represent the same 
thing (or things) the same way have the same content.4 Thus, the content of a 
representation captures how it represents things as being.  
All representations can be assessed as to whether they represent things as they are. 
I will be particularly interested in those types of representation, such as beliefs, 
assertions or perceptual experiences, which are regarded as correct if they represent 
things as they are.  
An absolutist view of representation insists that the correctness or truth of a 
representation, depends entirely on its representational content and on how things are. 
For instance, consider beliefs with the content that a particular wind is cold. On the 
absolutist view, the correctness or otherwise of these beliefs depends exclusively on 
what the wind in question is like objectively. It does not depend, for example, on who 
has the belief, how one has it, when one has it or where. A relativist view of the 
matter will deny this. The relativist will say that objective reality by itself does not yet 
settle for every given content, whether representations with that content represent the 
world correctly. Thus, a relativist might allow that I have a belief with the content that 
the wind is cold, that you have a belief with the very same content—you believe of 
the same wind that it is cold—but that my belief is correct, while yours is not. Or, if 
we return to our first example, according to a relativist in this area it is possible that I 
believe that the wind is cold, you believe about the very same wind that it is not cold, 
but that nevertheless we both represent reality correctly. The absolutist will deny the 
                                                 
3 There may well be important connections between the three issues. In particular, some might be led to 
think that there is no objective reality (first issue) because they think that there is no objectively correct 
answer to any question (third issue). In this case, the position on the first issue that denies an objective 
reality, defends globally, what the corresponding position on the third issue defends only locally. The 
second issue may also be thought to be connected in that some may believe that the absence of an 
objective reality on some topic entails that no mistakes on this topic are possible. However, I know of 
no good argument why such an entailment should hold. Nevertheless, the perceived connection 
between the second issue and the other issue seems to be largely responsible for the bad reputation of 
relativism as the view according to which “anything goes”.  
4 No doubt it is debatable whether all representation involves predication, or ascription of some 
property (or perhaps application of some concept) to some thing or things. I shall simply assume that 
representation involves representing something as being some way, that which way it represents which 
thing determines its representational content, and that the correctness of representations depends at 
least in part on this representational content. 
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possibility of both cases because she claims that the content of a representation alone 
determines whether it represents correctly. 
Here and in what follows, I shall be using a general notion of correctness of 
representations, such as beliefs or judgements. I believe that my use is immediately 
comprehensible and reflects pre-theoretical usage. However, given that “correct” is 
used in many different senses, and that we are on well-worn philosophical territory, it 
will be safer to add a few explanations: “correct” as here used, is used to assess a 
thinker’s performance, for example in making a judgement or having a belief. When I 
assess a person’s judgement as correct, then this does not mean that it would be 
correct for me to make a judgement with the same content. Rather, I am assessing 
whether that person meets the norms to which they are subject qua users of the 
concepts involved, i.e. whether it is correct for him or her to make a judgement with 
this content. 
For example, in a game of Mastermind, I might know that the winning 
combination does not contain green, because I myself set up the combination for my 
partner to guess. However, when my partner, who is trying to find out the 
combination, believes and says “the solution might contain green.”, there is a good 
sense in which I can assess my partner’s judgement as correct without myself judging 
that the solution might contain green (see figure 1). It is correct for my partner to 
judge that the solution might contain green just if the information available to my 
partner is compatible with the solution containing green (it would not, for example, 
have been correct for her to judge that the solution might contain two greens). I can 
acknowledge the correctness of her performance even when it would not be correct 
for me to make a judgement with the same content. One could construe the content of 
the belief assessed as correct in such a way that the correctness of your belief with 
that content entails that any belief with the same content must be correct (see, e.g., 
Dowell 2011), but this is not mandatory.  
 
Another example: Sara teaches little Ben the correct employment of the concept of 
pleasantness. While lukewarm saltless cauliflower puree pleases Ben, it does not 
please Sara. Ben judges that such puree is pleasant. Sara can assess Ben’s judgement 
as correct in our current sense without being thereby herself committed to judging the 
puree to be pleasant. Similarly, if Ben judges the puree not to be pleasant (perhaps 
before trying), Sara might assess his judgement as incorrect in the current sense, even 
though she herself would (correctly) judge the puree not to be pleasant.5 
                                                 
5 A third example would be eavesdropping cases, see e.g. Egan 2007: when Bond and Leiter overhear 
Number 2 saying “Bond might be in Zürich.”, Leiter can assess the utterance in two different ways: he 
can assess how well Number 2 performed in employing the expressions and concepts he did, and he 
can assess the content of Number 2’s utterance. The notion of correctness I am here discussing 
concerns the first type of assessment: Number 2’s utterance is correct in this sense. By contrast, if 
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Thus, assessments of correctness (in the sense in question) are assessments as to 
whether the person assessed is performing well, i.e. in accordance with their 
competence with the concepts they are employing. It is a separate question whether 
there are respects of similarity among performances that guarantee the same 
correctness status, what these respects are, and whether representational contents 
should be abstractions from such a similarity relation.6 
To summarize: absolutism about representational content is the view that the 
correctness of a given representation, such as a belief or an assertion, is always fully 
determined by the representation’s content: two (actual) representations with the same 
representational content are either both correct or both incorrect. Relativism about 
representational content, by contrast, maintains that there could be representations 
with the same representational content (and occurring in the same possible world) of 
which some are correct and others are not. For the relativist claims that the 
correctness of representations sometimes depends not only on the content but also on 
who has the representation when, how or where. 
3. Representational Content 
Contents of representation (of belief, assertion, etc) are theoretical entities and might 
be construed in several different ways, some of them relativist, some absolutist. Let us 
consider four types of belief state that you and I might have in a particular situation S 
(where we are both naturally interpreted as talking about the same wind when saying 
“the wind”): 
(1+) The type of belief in me that would make sincere an utterance by me of “The 
wind is cold.”. 
(1-) The type of belief in me that would make sincere an utterance by me of “The 
wind is not cold.”. 
(2+) The type of belief in you that would make sincere an utterance by you of “The 
wind is cold.”. 
(2-) The type of belief in you that would make sincere an utterance by you of “The 
wind is not cold.”. 
Let us assume, plausibly, that the absolutist and the relativist are agreed about which 
types of belief are picked out by the four labels and which of the four types of belief 
would be correct: namely that (1+) and (2-) would be correct, while (1-) and (2+) 
would be incorrect.7 Then the dispute between the absolutist and the relativist is a 
                                                 
Leiter is assessing, on his own behalf, the content that Bond might be in Zürich, he will have to assess 
it as incorrect, i.e. reject the content. Egan’s impression that it would be inappropriate for Leiter to 
assess the utterance as true seems to be guided by the second type of assessment: to call an utterance, 
or what someone said, true is to endorse the content oneself. 
6 See Kölbel 2013 for a discussion of this issue.  
7 To be a little more precise: the scenario is one where I actually have a belief of type (1+) and you 
have a belief of type (2-), and where types (1-) and (2+) are not instantiated. (1-) and (2+) are supposed 
to be the (uninstantiated) belief types that would make the respective utterances sincere, where the facts 
about the wind and facts about our dispositions to experience the wind are unchanged from actuality. 
Moreover, the situation is not one which invites an “exocentric” interpretation of any of the potential 
utterances (see Lasersohn 2005, p. 670). Thus, for example, the situation is not one where the question 
at issue is why some third person, Peter, is putting on a warm coat, so that one would understand an 
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dispute about how to model these mental states in terms of their representational 
contents.  
The absolutist adheres to the principle that two beliefs with the same 
representational content, i.e. two beliefs that represent the same world as being the 
same way, must either both represent the world correctly or both incorrectly. 
Representational contents are to represent reality correctly or incorrectly depending 
solely on what the represented aspects of reality are like. Hence, the absolutist 
concludes, (1+) and (2+) cannot represent reality in the same way, their 
representational content must differ. For otherwise it would be ruled out that the first 
is correct and the second is not—at least as long as we maintain that they concern the 
same reality.8 The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for (1-) and (2-). Both (1+) and (2+) 
seem to involve the ascription of coldness to the wind—apparently the same entity is 
represented as being the same way. So how could they differ as to correctness? The 
absolutist has for example the following two options. One is to say that (1+) and (2+), 
while being about the same entity (the wind), do not represent it in the same way. To 
flesh this out: the view might be, for example, that (1+) represents the wind as having 
the property of appearing cold to me, while (2+) represents it as appearing cold to 
you. Another is to say that (1+) and (2+), while both representing something as 
having the same feature, viz. coldness, they do not represent the same entity as having 
it. To flesh this out, the view might be that (1+) is a belief about my experience of the 
wind, while (2+) is a belief about your experience of the wind. 
A relativist can preserve the appearance that the same entity is represented as 
having the same feature, coldness, in both cases, and she can allow (1+) and (2+) to 
represent the world in the same way, to have the same representational content (the 
same goes for (1-) and (2-)). According to the relativist, the way a belief represents 
reality as being is not always sufficient to determine whether the belief is correct. 
Whether it is correct for me to represent the wind as cold depends not just on the wind 
and the properties it objectively has, but it also depends on how things are 
(objectively) with me, for example how I am disposed to respond when exposed to the 
wind.9 
A conciliatory view would have it that the relativist and the absolutist just employ 
different notions of representational content (and perhaps of representation), and that, 
as long as we are aware of the difference, there is no harm in using either or both. 
“Sameness of representational content” may be used to pick out similarity in various 
different respects. In other words, representational contents are always abstractions 
from some representation-relevant similarity relation. But several different similarity 
relations are relevant to representation, so we can introduce different notions of 
representational content depending on the respect of similarity that we are interested 
in. It is dogmatic to insist on there being only one correct respect of similarity that 
justifies speaking of “the same” representational content.  
                                                 
utterance of “the wind is cold.” in such a way that its correctness depends on how the wind feels to 
Peter. The idea is that relativist and absolutist can agree in their assessments as to which potential states 
are representationally correct and which are incorrect, even if they disagree on what the contents of 
these states are.  
8 But see the end of §4 for some remarks about the view that they do not concern the same reality. 
9 Going along with Plato’s description of the scenario, we might say: it is correct to believe this content 
for anyone whom the wind makes shiver (or whom it would make shiver, were they exposed to it under 
normal conditions), and not correct to believe it for anyone else. 
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Consider an analogy. Jim loves his wife. What does it take for Joe to do the same, 
i.e. what does it take for Joe to do as Jim does? That he love Jim’s wife, or that he 
love his own wife? When Bob believes that he was born in New Jersey, what does it 
take for me to believe the same, what does it take for me to believe what he believes? 
Do I need to believe that I too was born in New Jersey, or do I need to believe that 
Bob was born in New Jersey?10 It seems that such questions are best resolved by 
clarifying which respects of similarity one is talking about in each case. However, in 
the cases we are interested in, this is not always easy to do. 
4. Absolutism: representational correctness supervenes on 
representational content 
What are the respects of similarity that the absolutist might be interested in? Clearly, 
the absolutist is interested in those aspects of representational states that are sufficient 
to determine their representational correctness. So she is interested in representational 
states that are similar to one another in such a way that necessarily, if one is correct 
(or incorrect) then so is the other. Thus the similarity relation captured by the 
absolutist’s representational contents is a relation that at least preserves correctness 
status: sameness of content entails sameness of status as correct or incorrect. In other 
words, if we follow the absolutist’s strategy, there can be no difference as to the 
correctness of two beliefs without a difference in the content of these beliefs--at least 
if these beliefs occur in the same possible world. One might express this by saying 
that the correctness of a belief supervenes on its content (or on its content and its 
possible world). 
Whatever else the absolutist will say about the relevant relation of similarity, this 
constraint already guarantees that it marks out philosophically interesting equivalence 
classes. For it means that any two beliefs that are members of one such class (i.e. 
beliefs with the same content in the absolutist’s sense) are “in the same boat”: if one 
is correct (incorrect) then so is the other. If anyone believes one of these 
representational contents correctly, then whenever, wherever and by whomever the 
same content is believed, that belief will be representationally correct too.11 The 
absolutist’s strategy is to postulate representational contents that preserve correctness 
(at the same worlds). This construes representational contents as what one might 
metaphorically call “portable”, in that these contents encode information in such a 
way that they can be taken from one location to another—in space and time, from 
believer to believer—without loss of correctness.12 Portability is a desirable feature of 
                                                 
10 Cf Stalnaker 2008, p. 50. 
11 The idea of the supervenience of correctness on representational content concerns representational 
correctness only. Of course, the very same representational state can be assessed as correct or incorrect 
in a number of different ways. Thus, a belief might be representationally correct while being incorrect 
in some other way, e.g. unjustified, imprudent, impolite, etc. 
12 For the correctness status of an absolutist content to change, the objective facts would need to be 
different from what they actually are. In principle it is possible to extend the absolutist’s strategy to 
include non-actual representations. Thus we might say that two beliefs must share the same correctness 
status if they have the same content, even if these two beliefs are beliefs in different possible worlds. 
The resulting conception of representational content would be similar to Jonathan Schaffer’s 
“Necessitarianism” (see Schaffer 2012). Thus Necessitarianism is a limiting case of absolutism as 
defined here. 
  7 
representational contents, as it makes it simple to model the storage and transmission 
of information.13 
Another motivation that has been cited for an absolutist approach to 
representational content is the view that it is simply essential to the idea of 
representation that correctly functioning devices of representation cannot yield 
diverging representations if the object of representation is the same. Thus, Crispin 
Wright claims that 
If two devices each function to produce representations, then if conditions are 
suitable and they function properly, they will produce divergent output if and 
only if presented with divergent input. (Wright 1992, p. 91, see also Wright 
2008, pp. 170–1) 
On this view of representation, if you represent the wind as cold and I represent the 
same wind as not cold, then the representations can’t both be correct. In general, if 
one person represents reality to be a certain way while another represents it to be a 
different, incompatible way, then the representations can’t both be correct. 
Conversely, if one thinker represents reality to be a certain way and another thinker 
represents it to be the same way, then it is impossible that one represents correctly 
while the other does not. This view entails that there cannot be such a thing as 
“perspectival representation”, i.e. representation the correctness of which depends not 
only on the representational content but also on something else, such as the 
perspective (location, position) occupied by the thinker who is representing. 
This view can be seen as originating in the influential idea that representational 
contents should be bearers of truth, in the sense that a difference in truth-value 
necessarily indicates a difference in representational content. Frege (e.g. 1918) makes 
such an assumption and this leads him to claim that the content (“thought”) expressed 
by an indexical sentence on relevantly different occasions of use must be different. 
Many recent theorists follow this Fregean idea that the role of (absolute) truth-bearer 
is one of the constitutive roles of representational contents or propositions (see e.g. 
King 2007, Stanley 2007, Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009, Soames 2010 and Soames 
forthcoming). Following our conciliatory hypothesis, this just shows that these 
theorists are interested in modelling those representational properties of thought and 
language the sharing of which guarantees sameness of truth-value. To the extent, then, 
to which it is conceded in the Platonic example that my belief (1+) about the wind, 
that it is cold and your belief (2+) about the same wind that it is cold may differ in 
correctness status (and that truth requires correctness), they will not be treated by 
these theorists as being relevantly similar in the way they represent the world. 
How should an absolutist then respond to the Platonic example? As already 
mentioned, she could deny that beliefs (1+) and (2+) have the same representational 
content: they either represent different objects as having the same property, or they 
represent the same object as having different properties. Thus, whatever interesting 
                                                 
13 Stalnaker’s account of mental and linguistic representation is a paradigmatic example of this 
absolutist strategy (see, for example, Stalnaker 1984). According to Stalnaker, representational contents 
are sets of possibilities. To believe such a content is to locate the actual possibility in the set of 
possibilities that is that content. The belief is therefore correct just if the actual possibility is indeed a 
member of the content of that belief. Since there are only actual believers and the correctness of all 
beliefs therefore answers to the same possibility, Stalnaker’s system complies with the absolutist’s 
doctrine: the correctness of a belief is completely determined by that belief’s content. 
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similarities there may be between (1+), my belief that the wind is cold, and (2+), your 
belief that the wind is cold, these similarities are not to be construed as “sameness of 
representational content”. 
The only other option seems to be quite radical: to say that while (1+) and (2+) 
have the same content, they concern different realities: you and I inhabit different 
worlds, and if you believe things to be a certain way, then your belief is correct just if 
in your reality things are that way, while my belief is correct if in my reality things are 
that way. Thus, different people (people like you and me, who can interact causally) 
may end up inhabiting distinct worlds. This is the conclusion drawn by Iris Einheuser 
(2008, 2011). Einheuser mitigates the extravagance of this thesis by guaranteeing that 
the distinct worlds you and I inhabit at least share a common “substratum”. 
5. Relativism: correctness does not supervene on representational 
content 
We have seen some considerations that may motivate theorists to introduce an 
absolutist notion of representational content. What, if any, are the considerations in 
favour of operating with a relativistic notion, i.e. one that allows a variation in the 
correctness status of two beliefs despite their sameness of content? 
Let us return to our example, my belief in situation S that the wind is cold, i.e. my 
belief (1+), and your belief (2+), that the wind is cold. The relativist we were 
considering wants to say that these two beliefs have the same content, the content of 
representing the wind as cold. But they are dissimilar with respect to correctness: my 
belief (1+) is correct, while your belief (2+) is incorrect. So: similarity in which other 
respect is captured by saying that they have the same content? Several respects come 
to mind. (i) Both beliefs represent the same entity as having the same feature (or 
perhaps: both beliefs involve application of the same concept to the same entity). (ii) 
Both are beliefs that can be correctly reported by saying that the believer believes the 
wind to be cold. (iii) Both are beliefs that are correct if and only if the wind makes the 
respective believer shiver, or perhaps would make her shiver under certain normal 
conditions (if we follow Plato’s scenario). (iv) The possessors of (1+) and (2+) are 
similar in that, given a desire to avoid shivering, both ipso facto have a motive to take 
measures they believe to prevent shivering (such as putting on a coat).  
In other words, there are  
(i)  similarities in reference, predication and concept application involved in these 
beliefs,  
(ii)  similarities in the way these beliefs are reported,  
(iii)  similarities in the conditions a believer must meet for it to be correct to have 
such a belief, and finally  
(iv)  corresponding similarities in the further deliberative role of these beliefs.  
Similarities of type (iii) and (iv) would also motivate treating the following beliefs 
as having the same content: your belief, in a certain situation S2, that your own pants 
are on fire and my belief, also in S2, that my own pants are on fire. To clarify: here I 
mean the sort of belief that each of us could sincerely and correctly express by saying 
“My pants are on fire.”. Such beliefs are often called “de se beliefs”. The condition 
that each of us must meet for the belief to be correct is the same (in one good sense): 
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we must have pants on that are on fire (similarity (iii)). We are also similar in way 
(iv): for example, if either of us wanted to avoid horrific injury, and thought that those 
with pants on fire can only avoid horrific injury by jumping into water, then this 
belief would motivate us to jump into water. Thus on account of these two 
similarities, we might want to consider the beliefs as sharing the same content.  
However, in this case, we do not have the other two types of similarity: the two 
beliefs do not seem to predicate the same feature of (or apply the same concept to) the 
same object, for yours predicates the feature of your pants. while mine predicates it of 
my pants. Moreover, these beliefs would not normally be reported with the help of the 
same that-clause: you believe that your pants are on fire, while I believe that my pants 
are on fire. Only in special cases would the that-clause be the same. For example, if 
you report my belief and I report yours, we might both say “you believe that your 
pants are on fire”.  
If we think that similarity of type (iii) and (iv) is interesting enough for us to speak 
of sameness of representational content here, then we would have another motivation 
to depart from absolutism. For clearly, your belief that your pants are on fire might be 
correct while my belief that mine are is not, or vice versa. So if, on the grounds of a 
(iii)/(iv)-type similarity, we treated them as sharing the same content, we would have 
a case where correctness is not fully determined by content. 
Those who think that the correctness of representations should be determined by 
their contents might be unconvinced by these reasons and insist that we should 
therefore say that our beliefs have different contents. But this insistence on absolutism 
will not prevent absolutists from recognizing the similarities between our beliefs in 
some other way. Thus, Perry (1979) acknowledges that there is a difference between a 
belief I might naturally express by saying “My pants are on fire.” and a belief I might 
naturally express by saying “MK’s pants are on fire.”, but this is not a difference in 
content believed (as construed by Perry), but rather a difference in the belief state that 
has the content, i.e. a difference in the manner in which the content is believed. In line 
with Perry’s approach, one might also claim that my belief naturally expressed by 
“My pants are on fire.” and your belief naturally expressed by the same words, share 
some features: while these two beliefs have different contents, they are similar in that 
both attribute the same feature to the believer him or herself, thought of in a first-
person way. 
Thus we see the conciliatory hypothesis confirmed. Reserving talk of “having the 
same content” (or “differing in content”) for certain kinds of similarities (or 
differences) between representational states does not prevent a theorist from 
introducing other labels to mark out any other kind of similarity (or difference) he or 
she may be interested in.  
However, absolutist representational contents can be viewed as a special case of 
the more general relativist contents (or perhaps more accurately: a subset of 
relativistic contents can do all explanatory work done by corresponding absolutist 
contents—see e.g. Lewis 1979 and Egan 2007). Thus, if a need can be established to 
find the theoretical resources to represent (iii) and (iv)-type similarities amongst 
beliefs (or corresponding differences), an argument might be made that a relativist 
theory of representational content is more unified: it does all the work absolutists can 
do plus more besides. Lewis 1979 puts forward such an argument. He argues that if 
we want the representational contents we are operating with to capture everything an 
absolutist notion of content captures but also the similarity between Hume and 
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Heimson, who both believe to be Hume, then we need to operate with relativistic 
“centered contents”. For Hume’s belief is correct, Heimson’s is not, yet they are 
similar in the sense of (iv), so should be said to have the same content.14 However, 
intertheoretical comparisons for virtues such as unification and explanatoriness are 
notoriously difficult and rarely conclusive. A champion of absolutist representational 
content faced with distinctions that cannot be made in terms of absolutist contents, 
and who concedes that these distinctions should be made, can always insist, Perry-
style, that these are not differences in content. 
Let me briefly mention three more examples of arguments that can be offered for 
allowing contents that do not meet the absolutist constraint of determining correctness 
(keeping in mind that even if these arguments are successful, they do not establish 
that it is wrong to operate also with an absolutist notion of representational content). 
(1) Some argue that the content of perceptual experiences cannot be construed in 
an absolutist way (Bach 2007). Suppose I have a perceptual experience as of a pen in 
front of me. The experience might be veridical, in which case it is an experience of the 
pen in question. And the experience might be a hallucination, in which case there is 
no pen in front of me (e.g. when I am being deceived by some clever mechanism). 
Suppose we want to treat the veridical and the hallucinatory experience as sharing the 
same representational content. The only way to do this is evidently to allow 
representational contents that do not determine correctness. Bach construes these 
contents as “indexical” contents, i.e. contents that only count as correct (or incorrect) 
relative to some object of experience, so that a concrete experience does not count as 
correct (or incorrect) merely in virtue of its content, but in virtue of its content and 
standing in a certain causal relationship to some object of experience relative to which 
the content is correct (or incorrect). (This account allows perceptual contents to be 
suitably “particular” as opposed to “general”, which is the problem Bach is 
addressing. However, the need for non-absolutist contents is already established once 
it is accepted that of two experiences with the same content one is correct and one is 
incorrect.)  
(2) Egan (2006) also argues that the representational contents of perceptual 
experiences should be construed relativistically. His reasons are different. Egan 
argues that relativistic representational contents provide the best defence of the view 
he calls “intentionalism”, i.e. the view that the phenomenal character of an experience 
supervenes on its representational content. Intentionalism seems prima facie 
incompatible with the alleged possibility of “spectrum inversion”, e.g. a case where 
the phenomenal character of Ernie’s experiences when he sees green things may be 
the same as the phenomenal character of Vert’s experiences when he sees red things 
and vice versa. Shoemaker (1994) has claimed that the possibility of spectrum 
inversion and intentionalism need not be incompatible if we take the representational 
content of our experiences to involve the attribution of “appearance properties”, e.g. 
the property of looking a certain way. Egan argues that the best way in which to 
construe these appearance properties is as so-called “centering features”, i.e. features 
the correctness of attributing which depends on the predicament of the attributor. 
Thus Egan claims that we should construe the representational content of perceptions 
as not determining correctness, i.e. as relativistic.15  
                                                 
14 Lewis’ conclusion, stated in this way, does not depend on internalism about content, nor does it beg 
any questions (as Cappelen & Dever suggest, p. 87–8, footnote 2. 
15 For an excellent discussion of many issues surrounding perceptual content, including the present one, 
see Siegel 2013. 
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(3) Finally, a serious reason for wanting to introduce relativistic representational 
contents is given by the view that contingent matters in the future are not determined 
by the way things are in the present (see Belnap et al. 2001 and MacFarlane 2003, 
2008). Suppose Michael believes (and hopes) that in 2020 there will be peace in 
Syria. This belief (hope) surely has a determinate content (change the example, if 
peace seems too vague). Evidently, the view that the correctness of a belief 
supervenes on its representational content is in conflict with these two assumptions: 
the assumption that Michaels belief has a determinate representational content and the 
assumption that Michael’s belief is compatible with several future courses of events, 
some of which see peace in Syria in 2020, and some of which don’t. If Michael’s 
belief has a determinate content and the content of a belief determines its correctness 
status, then Michael’s belief is evidently not compatible with those future courses of 
events that are at odds with the correctness status of his belief (whichever it may be).  
Again, the absolutist has some options. She could simply deny that the future is 
genuinely open. Or she could deny that Michael’s belief has a determinate content—
perhaps the representational contents of beliefs regarding the contingent future only 
emerge gradually as and when the future takes its course. She might add, in line with 
the types of absolutist response we have seen previously, that Michael’s belief, while 
not having a determinate absolutist content, does now have a determinate quasi-
content that it will have had also from the perspective of 2020, whichever way things 
will have then turned out. On this view, then, Michael’s belief has a determinate 
quasi-content, but quasi-contents do not determine correctness so this does not come 
into conflict with the openness of the future. However, it does not have a determinate 
content in the proper absolutist sense. 
6. Relativism about Semantic Content: Rough Contours of the Issue 
I have introduced representational contents as theoretical entities that may be used to 
track interesting respects of similarity amongst representational states, for example 
beliefs. Recent discussions about the suitability of absolutist or relativist contents 
have been conducted on a background of more specific (implicit or explicit) 
assumptions about the explanatory and theoretical purposes for which these 
representational contents are to serve. The role of a semantic content within a 
semantic theory for a natural language has been a central focus of these debates, and 
relativism is frequently thought of as a proposal specifically within semantics16.  
The contours of the debate are very roughly the following. Most semanticists 
operate within a framework in which propositional semantic contents of some sort or 
other are assigned to sentences relative to “contexts of use”.17 The idea is usually that 
the content of a sentence at a context is (or determines) the content of an assertion that 
would be made by an utterance of the sentence made “in” that context. This content is 
also (or is related to) the content of a belief that could be sincerely expressed by such 
an utterance, and it is (or is related to) the content of a belief that a trusting hearer 
might acquire when witnessing the utterance. What is, roughly, under dispute is 
whether these semantic contents should be construed as entities that have absolute 
                                                 
16 See, for example, MacFarlane 2003, 2005a, 2011, 2014; Lasersohn 2005, 2008; Kölbel 2002, 2008a, 
Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson 2005, Egan 2007, 2011; von Fintel & Gillies 2008; Recanati 2007; 
Stojanovic 2007, Stephenson 2007a&b, 2010; Glanzberg 2007, 2009, Dowell 2011. This is just a small 
sample of a growing literature. 
17 NB: there are important exceptions, e.g. Davidson 1967, Bach 1994, 2001, Carston 2002. 
  12 
truth-values, or whether they should be construed as entities that have truth-values 
only relative to some interesting factor. Thus, to use the earlier example, it may be 
debated whether the content a semantics assigns in situation S to the sentence “The 
wind is cold.” should be construed as having an absolute truth-value, given how 
things actually are, or whether the truth-value should be relative to, for example, a 
personal standard or perspective.  
Moving on to a slightly less rough characterization of the issues, most semanticists 
use a double-index framework. In such a framework, a semantic theory assigns 
intensions to expressions at contexts of use. Intensions are meaning entities that have 
variable extensions: their extensions vary with some factor, call this a “point of 
evaluation”, such as a possible world or perhaps an n-tuple containing a possible 
world, a time and possibly other factors. In the simplest case, an intension simply is a 
function from points of evaluation to extensions. Thus, many semanticist will for 
example say that sentences in context express propositions, where propositions are 
entities that have extensions, i.e. truth-values, relative to points of evaluation. 
Intensions can be operated on by intensional operators, such as modal or temporal or 
doxastic operators. Examples of natural language expressions that might be construed 
as such operators would be, respectively, “possibly”, “sometimes” and “John believes 
that”. In addition, in double index semantics, the intension expressed by an expression 
may vary in regular ways from one context of use to another. For example, “I” and 
“you” are thought to vary in their intension (and therefore extension) from one 
context of use to another. 
Thus, if someone addresses me and says “You are french.”, then the sentence at the 
context in which it was used expresses a sentence intension (a proposition) that is true 
at all possible worlds at which I, MK, am french. In this sentence, the expression 
“you” is regarded as context-sensitive, while the expression “are french” is regarded 
not as context-sensitive, but as having a variable intension: different people will be in 
the extension at different possible worlds. Thus, double-index semantics recognizes 
several different ways in which the extension of an expression can vary: context-
dependence (as with “you”) and index-dependence (as with the contingent predicate 
“are french”18). 
The debate about relativism about semantic content concerns the status of certain 
alleged forms of extensional variation: whether they should be treated as context-
dependence, as index-dependence, or whether the alleged extensional variation should 
be rejected as merely apparent. Thus, to return to the earlier simple example, there are 
those who want to construe the meaning of “is cold.” in “The wind is cold.” as 
varying in intension (content) from one context of use to another (much like the 
predicate “feels cold to me.” would). This type of view is often called 
“contextualism”. Secondly, there are those who want to construe the intension 
(content) of “is cold.” as invariant from one context to another, but exhibiting index-
dependence, i.e. varying in extension with a parameter included in the point of 
evaluation (perhaps a coldness standard, or simply a judge). This type of view is often 
                                                 
18 The alert reader will notice that the extension of “are french” varies not only with a possible world, 
but also with time. So a further question will arise as to whether this variability should be construed as 
context-dependence or as index-dependence. This is the issue debated between defenders of a 
traditional Priorian intensional treatment of tense (e.g. Kamp 1971, Kaplan 1977, Blackburn 1994 and 
the current mainstream approach as e.g. in Partee 1973, 1984 and King 2003.  
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labelled “relativism”.19 Finally, there are those who deny the relevant variability of 
extension altogether and claim that the predicate exhibits neither context-dependence 
nor index-dependence (except perhaps in the sense that the content expressed is 
contingent, i.e. varies in truth-value from one world to another). This last type of view 
may be called “absolutism”. 
There are a number of areas where this debate arises, for example predicates of 
personal taste (e.g. “is tasty”), other evaluative language (e.g. aesthetically or morally 
evaluative), expressions expressing epistemic modality or probability, expressions 
used to attribute knowledge, and many more, including the phenomena of tense and 
modality.20 A number of considerations have been brought to bear on the question of 
whether there is a real variation in extension, and on whether this variation should 
receive a contextualist or a relativist treatment. The sequel to this article will examine 
some of these considerations in more detail. 
6. Conclusion 
To summarise, absolutism about representational content is the traditional view that 
the correctness status (and a fortiori the truth-value) of a representation, such as a 
belief or assertion, is determined by the representation’s content. Relativism denies 
absolutism, i.e. claims that representations equal in representational content can 
nevertheless differ as to their correctness. We have seen a number of examples of 
contrasting views on representational content, including some motivations that can be 
adduced in favour of introducing absolutist or relativist notions of representational 
content. It was interests in different respects of similarity and difference amongst 
representations that motivated the different notions of content used by different 
theorists.  
Up to this point we have not seen any reason to believe that there is anything 
beyond a mere verbal difference between the two approaches. For all we know they 
may be compatible, as long as we differentiate suitably between the different notions 
of content employed. Nevertheless, debates about the topic often present themselves 
as substantive disputes, with one party claiming that the other party cannot account 
for this or that phenomenon. The cases here discussed suggested that the impression 
of a substantive conflict is mistaken. However, there may well be competing accounts 
of representational content that are in genuine competition because they have the 
same theoretical objectives or aim at explanation of the same phenomena, so that one 
can compare the accounts with regard to their ability to account for these phenomena 
or to meet these objectives. The general issue between absolutists and relativists about 
representational contents takes on a more specific form in recent debates about “the” 
correct conception of semantic content. The sequel of this article (“Relativism 2: 
Semantic Content”) will explore this question in more depth.21 
                                                 
19 The terminology varies: what I have called “contextualism” is sometimes called “indexical 
contextualism”, and what I have called “relativism” is sometimes called “non-indexical contextualism 
(see MacFarlane 2005b).  
20 See e.g. DeRose 1992; Egan, Hawthorne and Weatherson 2005; Egan 2007, 2011; Einheuser 2011, 
García-Carpintero & Kölbel (eds) 2008; Glanzberg 2007, 2009; Kölbel 2002, 2003; MacFarlane 2003, 
2005b; Recanati 2007; Schaffer 2011; Wright 2008. Baghramian & Carter (forthcoming), Kölbel 
2008b, 2012 and MacFarlane 2012 contain further  references to this literature. 
21 I would like to thank many people for comments on this work, in particular the philosophers at the 
Osnabrück University philosophy colloquium and the participants in the June 2014 meeting of the 
project Semantic Content and Conversational Dynamics, and two anonymous referees. Special thanks 
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